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SENTENCING DISCRETION:
Current Trial and Appellate Court Perspectives In Idaho
Hon. Dar Cogswell, District Judge
Hon. Don Burnett, Judge, Court of Appeals
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
This Is an outline of current sentencing standards presented to the
Idaho Judicial Conference in July, 1984. The contents are descriptive,
not evaluative. They set forth the standards found in Idaho today, not
necessarily the standards that may, or should, evolve in the future.
Sentencing Is a rapidly changing area of the law. The concept of
sentencing discretion itself has come under critical scrutiny. Readers
of this outline are urged to keep abreast of new court decisions and possi-
ble legislative action, prescribing additional standards to guide or to limit
sentencing discretion.
I. DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
A. General standard. The primary responsibility for sentencing
rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. E.g., State v.
Osborn, 104 Idaho 809, 663 P.2d 1111 (1983); State v. Relnke, 103
Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1983).
B. Probation v. confinement.
1. The choice of probation, among the available sentencing
altematives, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 566, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1983).
2. The exercise of discretion is guided by Idaho Code 19-2521,
which prescribes criteria for weighing probation against a
sentence of confinement.
3. Denial of probation will not be deemed a "clear abuse of
discretion" if the decision is consistent with the criteria articulated
in I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Toohill, supra.
4. Conditions of probation must be reasonably related to the
rehabilitative purpose of probation. State v. Vaughn, 105 Idaho
494, 670 P.2d 901 (1983).
C. Retention of jurisdiction. Refusal to retain jurisdiction, for fur-
ther evaluation of a defendant, will not be deemed a "clear abuse
of discretion" If the trial court already has sufficient information to
determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be In-
appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Toohill, supra.
D. Confinement.
1. Unlike the choice between probation and confinement, the
determination of sentence length is not guided by any statutory
criteria, except the maximum term.
2. If a sentence Is within the statutory maximum it will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the appellant affirmatively shows a
"clear abuse of discretion." State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 602
P.2d 71 (1979); State v. Toohill, supra.
3. Reasonableness is a fundamental requirement. A sentence
may represent a "clear abuse of discretion" If it is shown to be
unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982); State v. Toohill, supra.
4. A term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears
necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution applicable
to a given case. A sentence of confinement longer than necessary
for these purposes is unreasonable. State v. Toohill, supra.
5. Length of confinement may be indeterminate under I.C. §
19-2513 or fixed under I.C. § 19-2513A.
a) A fixed sentence, unlike an indeterminate sentence, must
be served entirely in confinement. State v. Rawson, 100 Idaho
308,597 P.2d 31 (1979); State v. Miller, 105 Idaho 838, 637
P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1983).
b) The duration of a fixed life sentence Is the full natural
life of the inmate. State v. Wilson, 105 Idaho 669, 672 P.2d
237 (Ct. App. 1983) (petition for review granted).
c) A sentence to a fixed term of years less than life may
be imposed for first degree murder, as an alternative to fixed
or indeterminate life imprisonment. The term of confinement
under such a sentence must be no less than that which would
be required to be served under an indeterminate life sentence.
State v. Wilson, supra (2-1 decision on this point).
E. Reduction of sentence (of confinement). The decision
whether to reduce a sentence rests In the sound discretion of the
sentencing court. Such a motion is essentially "a plea of leniency"
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was, for
any reason, unduly severe. State v. Lopez, - Idaho _ ,
680 P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1984).
I. EXERCISE OF SENTENCING DISCRETION
A. Focus on offense and offender.
1. The trial court must sentence the Individual and not the crime
category; the process must, therefore, be an individualized con-
sideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the of-
fense. Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App.
1983).
2. The court must examine the record with regard to the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection
of the public Interest. State v. Schideler, 103 Idaho 593, 651 P.2d
527 (1982).
3. The sentencing process must allow flexibility, in order that
it be humane and sensitive to the individual defendant. State v.
Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983) (capital punishment
case).
4. Revocation of probation.
a) Where probation Is revoked, the relevant sentencing facts
Include those which have come to light between pronounce-
ment of the original sentence and the execution of a sentence
upon revocation of probation. State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848,
673 P.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1983).
b) Where original sentence was lawful, it may not be
Increased upon revoking probation. State v. Pedraza, 101
Idaho 440,614 P.2d 980 (1980); State v. Mendenhall,
Idaho _ , 679 P.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
B. Presentence Information.
1. The court is free to consider the results of the prehearing
investigation if the reliability of the information contained in the
report is insured by certain protections: (1) that the defendant
be afforded a full opportunity to present favorable evidence; (2)
that the defendant be afforded a reasonable opportunity to ex-
amine all the materials contained in the presentence report; and
(3) that the defendant be afforded a full opportunity to explain
and rebut adverse evidence. State v. Creech, supra.
2. Where no objection has been made to a presentence report
at a sentencing hearing, and the report substantially addresses
the points required by court rule, a challenge to the report will
not be reviewed on appeal. State v. Toohill, supra.
3. Sentencing court also may consider other information
presented to him in his official capacity, with notice to the par-
ties. State v. Gibson, __ Idaho , P.2d
-(Ct. App. No. 13830, slip op. Feb. 29, 1984).
4. The trial court is not bound by recommendations of the state,
even though offered In conjunction with a plea negotiation. The
state's recommendation to the trial court is purely advisory. State
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v. Rossi, 105 Idaho 681, 672 P.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1983).
C. Consecutive and enhanced sentences.
1. The Imposition of a consecutive sentence Is authorized and
made discretionary by I.C. § 18-308. The exercise of that discre-
tion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is abused. State v.
Lloyd, 104 Idaho 397, 659 P.2d 151 (Ct. App. 1983).
2. If a person escapes from custody while charged with or con-
victed of a felony, I.C. § 18-2505 requires that any sentence of
confinement for the escape be consecutive to confinement Im-
posed for the underlying felony. State v. Thomas 98 Idaho 623,
570 P.2d 860 (1977); State v. Mendenhall, supra.
3. An indeterminate life sentence cannot be "enhanced" by
additional punishment for use of a firearm; but consecutive
sentences for different crimes are permissible. State v. Kaiser,
_ Idaho _ , - P.2d __ (Ct. App. No.
13711, slip op. April 24, 1984). (2-1 decision; petition for review
granted.)
D. Reasons for sentencing decisions.
1. While setting forth reasons for imposition of a particular
sentence would be helpful, and is encouraged, it is not mandatory.
State v. Nield, __ Idaho _ , __ P.2d__
(S. Ct. No. 15218 slip op. June 6,1984) (3-2 decision). See also
State v. Brewster, - Idaho ., P.2d
- (S. Ct. No. 15042, slip op. February 15, 1984); State
v. Osborn, 104 Idaho 809, 663 P.2d 1111 (1983).
2. Supreme Court's majority decision in Nield overrules prior
holdings by Court of Appeals requiring judges In felony cases
to state of record the reasons for their sentencing decisions. See
State v. Nield, 105 Idaho 153, 666 P.2d 1164 (Ct. App. 1983);
State v. Tisdale, 103 Idaho 836, 654 P.2d 1389 (Ct. App. 1982).
Ill. REVIEW OF SENTENCING DISCRETION
A. General standard. Sentencing determinations cannot be made
with precision. In deference to the discretionary authority vested in
Idaho's trial courts, an appellate court will not substitute its view for
that of a sentencing judge where reasonable minds might differ. An
appellant must show that, under any reasonable view of the facts,
his sentence was excessive in light of the criteria of protection of
society, retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. State v. Toohill,
supra.
B. Specific criteria.
1. Protection of society Is the paramount sentencing con-
sideration. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978);
State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 304 P.2d 1101 (1956).
a) "Protection of society" has not been specifically defined
by appellate opinion. It might refer to general protection
against crime or to specific protection against the particular
defendant.
b) The Court of Appeals has used the phrase in a specific
sense, relating to protection from the conduct of a particular
defendant. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 105 Idaho 166, 667
P.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Wilde, 104 Idaho 461, 660
P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1983).
2. The public has a legitimate interest in retribution for a crime
of violence. State v. Pettit, 104 Idaho 601, 661 P.2d 767 (Ct. App.
1983).
a) "[Tihe public interest demands that our criminal justice
system convey a clear messag, through the sentencing pro-
cess, that the use of deadly foice ... is condemned by society
and will be firmly punished.' Pettit, 104 Idaho at 603, 661
P.2d at 769.
b) "An unintentional killing takes from the victim what an
offender never can restore - the fragile gift of life. It is the
final betrayal of another human being and the ultimate affront
to civility. Our courts have no deeper obligation than to ex-
press society's condemnation of this act." State v. Miller, 105
Idaho 838, 841, 673 P.2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1983).
3. General deterrence, by itself, is a sufficient reason for im-
posing a prison sentence. State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 577 P.2d
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1123 (1978); State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 665 P.2d 1102 (Ct.
App. 1983); State v. Pettit, supra.
4. "[l]n some cases, where genuine rehabilitation opportunities
exist, lengthy confinement without any remedial programs can
be counterproductive. It may actually diminish a prisoner's ability
or motivation to conform his conduct to the law when he is even-
tually released." Pettit, 104 Idaho at 603, 661 P.2d at 769. (Em-
phasis added.)
a) Selection of an indeterminate, rather than fixed, sentence
is an Indicator that the sentencing judge has considered
rehabilitation and parole potential in reaching his decision.
See State v. Adams, - Idaho , _ P.2d
-(Ct. App. No. 14874, slip op. March 13, 1984).
b) A substantial term of Imprisonment will not be overturned
solely because of the youthful age of the offender. State v.
Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1982).
C. Measuring the length of sentences Imposed.
1. For the purpose of sentence review, the duration of confine-
ment imposed by a fixed sentence Is the term of the sentence
less the formula reduction available as a matter of right for good
conduct under I.C. § 20-101A. State v. Miller, supra.
2. For the purpose of appellate review of an Indeterminate
sentence, one-third of the sentence will be deemed an ap.
propriate measure of the term of confinement, absent a contrary
statute or Indication in the record. State v. Toohill, supra; ac-
cord State v. Nleld (Ct. App.), supra, overruled on other
grounds, State v. Nield (S. Ct.), supra
a) This measure of confinement Is not a prediction of
whether, or when, parole actually might occur. Rather, It Is
a general approximation of confinement Intended solely to
facilitate the necessarily imprecise task of reviewing an In-
determinate sentence on appeal. Under Idaho law parole is
merely a possibility, not an expectancy. Parole may be granted
earlier, later, or not at all. State v. Nield (Ct. App.), supra.
b) I.C. § 20-223 Is not a "contrary" statute under the Toohill
"one-third rule." The one-third measure will be applied even
if a prisoner might be eligible for parole consideration earlier
under the statute. State v. Jenkins, supra (modifying State
v. Pettit, supra).
D. Sentencing disparity.
1. Sentences cannot be deemed disparate upon simplistic com-
parison of results. Different sentences, which are properly attuned
to the individual circumstances presented In each case, do not
reflect disparate treatment of the defendants. The constitutional
right to equal protection does not mandate uniform sentencing.
State v. Seifart, 100 Idaho 321, 597 P.2d 44 (1979); State v. Lopez,
_ Idaho _ , 680 P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1984). See also
State v. Martinez, 105 Idaho 841, 673 P.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1983).
2. Appellate decisions affirming particular sentences "[do] not
necessarily signify that we considered those sentences adequate
in the cases where they were Imposed. We were not asked to
review those sentences for adequancy; we were asked to review
them for excessiveness. We held that they were not excessive."
Miller, 105 Idaho at 841, 673 P.2d at 441.
E. Vindictive sentence. A judge's mention of the defendant's elec-
tion to go to trial, rather than to plead guilty, does not establish per
se that the sentence imposed was vindictive. Vindictiveness will be
evaluated on appeal in light of the totality of the circumstances, con-
sidering the sentencing judge's words and actions as a whole. State
v. Regester, __ Idaho _ , _ P.2d - (Ct.
App. No. 14246 slip op. February 28, 1984).
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